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Beaten to "Submissions": Talent Agents Score a Victory
over Managers on Submissions of Motion Picture
Screenplays
Matthew H. Schwartz*
The fervently contested boundaries in Hollywood's turf war between
talent agents and talent managers have recently been fortified in favor of
the former. According to a recent decision by the California Labor
Commissioner, submissions of motion picture screenplays will most
likely be deemed regulated activities under California's Talent Agencies
Act ("Act").' Consequently, talent managers must now be extremely
cautious as they attempt to advance the careers of their scribe clientele.
In 1982, the California State Legislature inaugurated the California
Entertainment Commission ("Commission") to study the entertainment
industry, and to ultimately propose a model bill for the licensure of pro-
fessionals in this business.2 After the Commission presented its report
to state officials, the Legislature was quick to enact many of the recom-
mendations therein. What resulted was a comprehensive 1986 amend-
ment to the Talent Agencies Act which established strict licensing re-
quirements for talent agents.3 The unambiguous objective of this
legislative enhancement was to protect the state's valuable community
of artists who are considered characteristically susceptible to abuse by
their business representatives.
The 1986 amendment also reflects the Legislature's resolve to govern
the business of "talent agenting" in general. In fact, the Legislature took
measures to regulate talent agents in their business almost as closely as
it regulates attorneys in the practice of law. A few samples of strict tal-
ent agency regulations include bonding requirements;4 prohibition of li-
* Author is the managing partner at Sussman & Schwartz located in Century City, Cali-
fornia. He practices Entertainment Law, Business Litigation, Labor Law and Criminal De-
fense, and was counsel of record for Petitioner in Strouse v. Corner of the Sky, Inc., Cal. La-
bor Comm'n Case No. TAC 13-00 (2001).
1. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (West 1989).
2. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1702 (West 1982), repealed by 1984 Cal. Legis. Serv. 553 (West).
3. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.15-16 (West 1989).
4. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.15-.16 (West 1989).
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cense assignments;5 required approval from the Labor Commissioner for
the form of contracts to be used with artists;6 records maintenance re-
quirements;7 employment restrictions;' investigations and background
checks to determine applicants' good characters;9 and prohibitions
against referral fees, division of fees and registration fees. 10
The emergence of new and aggressive management companies in the
entertainment industry ostensibly forces a blurring of the significant dis-
tinction between an artist's "agent" and an artist's "manager". Such
managers seem to increasingly tread upon professional territory that is
exclusively reserved for licensed talent agents. Unlike talent agents, tal-
ent managers are not regulated by any statutes at the present time.
Their duties typically include advising, counseling, directing, and coor-
dinating the development of an artists' career. " Furthermore, they may
offer advice about business and personal matters, frequently lend money
to artists, and may also serve as spokespersons for their clients.'" How-
ever, sometimes managers attempt to obtain work for their clients in the
entertainment industry. Whether they realize this or not, this is where
they go too far. The Talent Agencies Act expressly prohibits anyone
other than licensed talent agents from procuring (or even merely at-
tempting to procure) employment for qualified artists.13
Although a violation of the Talent Agencies Act is not prosecuted as a
crime, the consequences can be quite severe. All remuneration earned
under a contract voided by a violation of the Act will be disgorged and
returned to the aggrieved artist. This will be the result even where the
act of procurement (or the attempt to procure employment) was merely
incidental to a copious amount of managerial services otherwise ren-
dered legitimately.' 4 Any single act of procurement necessarily draws a
person or entity within the domain governed by the Talent Agencies
Act.' 5 Nevertheless, there is one slight exception to the licensing re-
quirements of the Talent Agencies Act. An unlicensed person is permit-
5. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.20 (West 1989).
6. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23 (West 1989).
7. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.26 (West 1989).
8. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.35 (West 1989).
9. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.7 (West 1989).
10. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.39-.40 (West 1989 & Supp. 2002).
11. Park v. Deftones, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 616, 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
12. Park, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618-19.
13. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (West 1989).
14. Park, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
15. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., Inc. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 444-45 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
ted to work in concert with a licensed talent agent and may attempt to
procure employment on behalf of a qualified artist provided that these
procurement efforts are performed at the request of the licensed talent
agent.16 Another vexing issue for unlicensed managers concerns ser-
vices that are rendered gratuitously. It has been adjudicated that it is ir-
relevant whether or not a manager receives compensation for a single,
incidental act of unlicensed procurement efforts.17 The management
contract will nevertheless be deemed void ab initio.18 Indeed, the report
submitted by the Commission in 1985 specifically recounts how the
Commission deliberated and rejected a proposal which would have ex-
empted from the Act those who do not charge fees or commissions for
procuring employment for artists.19 It expressly concluded that "per-
sonal managers or anyone not licensed as a talent agent should not, un-
der any condition or circumstances, be allowed to procure employment
for an artist without being licensed as a talent agent, except in accor-
dance with the present provisions of the Act. "20
It should also be noted that one who violates the Act will not be per-
mitted to avail him or herself of quantum meruit-type relief because a
violation of the Act is per se illegal conduct, notwithstanding the lack of
criminal prosecution.21 It renders the perpetrators in pari delicto, and
consequently deprives them of opportunities to invoke a court's equita-
ble powers. 22 "[A] party cannot come into a court of law and ask to
have his illegal objects carried out.'' 23  "[T]he courts generally will not
enforce an illegal bargain or lend their assistance to a party who seeks
compensation for an illegal act."' 24 If a party cannot make a case against
a defendant other than through the medium of an illegal transaction to
which he is a party, no relief whatsoever will be afforded him.25 By
categorically refusing to give such contracts any tangential force or ef-
fect, the courts presumably succeed in dissuading parties from entering
16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (West 1989).
17. Park, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619-20.
18. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446-47 (quoting REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA ENTER-
TAINMENT COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 17 (1985) [hereinafter Enter-
tainment Commission Report]).
19. Entertainment Commission Report, supra n. 18 at 6.
20. Id.
21. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446-47.
22. Id.
23. Lee On v. Long, 234 P.2d 9, 11 (Cal. 1951) (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 280 (1999)
(previously § 272)).
24. Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 308 P.2d 713, 719 (Cal. 1957).
25. Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 702 P.2d 570, 576 (Cal. 1985).
Beaten to "Submissions"gnrino flfl2
148 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 22-1
into illicit transactions.
Many uninformed entertainment professionals may be unclear about
what actually constitutes an attempt to procure employment. Perceived
ambiguity and naive wishful thinking may dangerously embolden their
client service strategies. Over the last few years, the California Labor
Commissioner has been forging a brighter line through this perceived
fuzzy landscape. Hollywood neophytes are generally aware that con-
ducting negotiations on behalf of qualified artists for the procurement of
employment is a protected activity. However, even seasoned Holly-
wood professionals may be surprised to learn that a one-minute tele-
phone call to arrange a simple social meeting between a qualified artist
and a potential employer may implicate the Talent Agencies Act. This
circumstance can be reasonably interpreted as an attempt to procure em-
ployment. Moreover, placing an advertisement in a trade magazine that
promotes a qualified artist may also be construed as an "attempt" to pro-
cure employment for that artist. But what about the attempted sale of
an artist's property? Would an unlicensed manager of screenwriters be
risking all of their fees by simply calling a producer or a studio execu-
tive to arrange a "weekend read" of their client's screenplay? In a re-
cent decision, the Labor Commissioner determined that absent a specific
kind of compelling evidence, the mere submission of a motion picture
screenplay by an unlicensed person or entity is a direct violation of the
Talent Agencies Act 26
Strouse v. Corner of the Sky, Inc.27 was a case of first impression be-
fore the Labor Commissioner. It presented the issue of whether the
submission of a motion picture screenplay constitutes an attempt to pro-
cure employment for a writer.28 In 1994, the Labor Commissioner faced
a similar issue in Davenport v. AFH Talent Agency. 29 However, Daven-
port concerned the submission of a novel for the potential purchase of
its publication rights.3" Although motion picture screenwriters and tele-
vision writers are expressly identified as qualified artists for the pur-
poses of the Talent Agencies Act,3 ' "novelists" are not considered as
such. Consequently, the analysis in Davenport was irrelevant to the
26. Strouse v. Corner of the Sky, Inc., Cal. Labor Comm'n Case No. TAC 13-00 (Cal.
2001).
27. Id.
28. Id at 4.
29. Davenport v. AFH Talent Agency, Cal. Labor Comm'n Case No. TAC 43-94 (Cal.
2001).
30. Id.
31. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1700.4(b) (West 1989).
Strouse case.
In Strouse, the Petitioner entered into oral and written agreements
with Respondent for the rendition of talent manager services. 32  The
written contract explicitly stated that Respondent would not attempt to
procure employment for Petitioner. It provided a standard ten percent
commission schedule on all properties sold by Petitioner during the term
of the contract and its grace period. Petitioner claimed that she specifi-
cally negotiated the exclusion of all pre-existing screenplays from Re-
spondent's commission schedule, and that only works created during the
term of the management contract were subject to commissions. Re-
spondent contended that all pre-existing screenplays were included in
the commission schedule.
The contract was terminated two years into the parties' relationship.
Shortly thereafter, Petitioner acquired a licensed talent agent who sold
two of Petitioner's screenplays for a total of $2.2 million. Both works
were penned before Respondent contracted with Petitioner. Although
the disputed contracts were formally terminated, the sales of the screen-
plays fell within the grace period during which commissions on sales
would still be payable to Respondent. When Petitioner refused to pay
Respondent a ten percent commission on each of the two pre-existing
properties, Respondent filed suit against her in Superior Court seeking
$220,000 in damages.
During Respondent's deposition in the resulting lawsuit, Respondent
testified that it submitted Petitioner's screenplays to over thirty produc-
ers and studios in the hopes that they would eventually be sold. No ne-
gotiation for the sale or option of these screenplays ever ensued from
Respondent's unsuccessful submission campaign. Respondent also testi-
fied that if any genuine interest from a potential buyer would have sur-
faced from its submission campaign, it would have secured a licensed
talent agent to conduct any resulting negotiations on behalf of Petitioner.
Respondent explained that it was doing what it felt was necessary to ad-
vance the career of its client according to the written contract. Peti-
tioner then stayed the litigation as she filed an action before the Labor
Commissioner for a determination that the management contract vio-
lated the Talent Agencies Act.33
Respondent's argument was twofold. First, its mere submissions of
32. Strouse, TAC 13-00 at 3-4.
33. Id. The California Labor Commissioner exercises original jurisdiction over such is-
sues to the exclusion of the Superior Court. Buchwald v. Superior Court of San Francisco,
62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
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motion picture screenplays to potential purchasers did not constitute at-
tempts to sell the screenplays, because no negotiations ever resulted
from this campaign;34 and second, an attempted sale of intellectual prop-
erty does not constitute an attempt to procure employment. 35
The Labor Commissioner was not at all persuaded by the first argu-
ment." The decision cites the literal definition of "attempt" as it is ren-
dered in Merriam Webster's Tenth Edition Dictionary. 7  An "attempt"
is an "act or an instance of attempting".3" It is also defined as "an un-
successful effort".39  By submitting a screenplay to a potential pur-
chaser with the hope that it is consequently purchased, someone would
literally be attempting to sell that screenplay. In this context, screen-
play submissions are much like direct mail solicitations. They are, in
fact, a form of direct marketing to a very select community of potential
customers. Therefore, this conduct must be regarded as an "attempt" to
sell a screenplay by any rational standard. Moreover, the Respondent's
self-serving testimony about how it would have involved a licensed tal-
ent agent if there was genuine interest from a prospective purchaser was
not particularly helpful. The Labor Commissioner rejected the notion
that it would be appropriate to speculate whether or not this was a true
intent.4" In any event, this contention blatantly runs afoul of the Talent
Agencies Act, as Respondent's submissions were not undertaken at the
request of a licensed talent agent.41
The second argument was more intriguing. The Talent Agencies Act
obviously restricts efforts to procure employment for qualified artists.
However, it does not expressly apply to the sale of a qualified artist's
property - tangible or otherwise. Respondent may very well have
analogized these circumstances to the sale of an artist's automobile. Re-
spondent simply explained that it was attempting to sell property, not
services.42 At first blush, its efforts did not seem to involve any issues
of employment. However, Petitioner proffered uncontested expert tes-
timony which impacted this analysis enough to expand the conventional
reach of the Act.
34. Strouse, TAC 13-00, at 4-5.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 4-5.
37. Id. at 4 n.2.
38. Id. (citing MERRIAM WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 74 (10th ed. 1994)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1700.44 (West 1989).
42. Strouse, TAC 13-00, at 5.
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Petitioner's expert was a movie producer who produced over twenty-
five fairly well known feature films. Moreover, he personally negoti-
ated hundreds of screenplay acquisition agreements as a buyer during
his illustrious career which spans more than twenty years. He testified
that every negotiation for the acquisition of a motion picture screenplay
implicitly contemplates whether a writer will get hired to do a rewrite
43
or a polish44 of the subject screenplay. Although Petitioner's expert did
not testify that writers are always hired for future services, he did estab-
lish that the custom and practice in the state's motion picture industry is
that both parties to such a negotiation fully anticipate discussions on
possible future writing services. Of course, it is immaterial whether a
rewrite or polish is actually procured, because the Act governs "at-
tempts" in addition to actual procurements of employment. Therefore, if
it was determined that Respondent attempted to sell a screenplay by way
of a submission campaign, it would follow logically that Respondent
implicitly attempted to procure future writing services as well.
However, despite its findings regarding the customs and practices of
screenplay acquisitions, the Labor Commissioner did not go so far as to
rule that every motion picture screenplay submission is a protected ac-
tivity under the Act. Instead, the Labor Commissioner held that if an
unlicensed manager can establish with compelling evidence that both
rewrites and polishes were expressly excluded from any attempted sale
of a motion picture screenplay, the submission itself will not be subject
to the restrictions of the Act.45 Therefore, a manager would have to
overcome a fairly strong presumption that a screenplay submission is
unlawful. For example, if an unlicensed manager proffers a written let-
ter from his/her client indicating that the manager was encouraged to
sell a screenplay but not authorized to negotiate for rewrites and pol-
ishes, the manager could probably prevent the disgorgement of his/her
fees. Also, the attempted sale of a deceased writer's screenplay would
presumably not violate the Act because no future services could possibly
be rendered by that artist.
The decision in Strouse sets forth the new official policy of the Labor
Commissioner regarding submissions of motion picture screenplays and
teleplays. Since aggressive talent managers continue to perform more
43. According to the Writer's Guild of America, a rewrite is the "writing of significant
changes in plot, storyline or interrelationships of characters in a screenplay." Writer's Guild
of America Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement, May 2, 1995, art. l(B)(b)(7), at 17.
44. The Writer's Guild of America defines a polish as a "writing of changes to dialogue,
narration and/or action, but not including a rewrite." Id.
45. Strouse, TAC 13-00, at 8.
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talent agent services outside the aegis of intended regulation, Strouse
emerged as a timely opportunity for the California Labor Commissioner
to eliminate at least a portion of this problematic trend. Although it can
be challenged in the courts, this approach will likely withstand further
judicial scrutiny. Judges seem to harbor a fair amount of deference to-
wards decisions by the Labor Commissioner that apply and interpret the
Act, because the Commissioner is far more regularly involved with the
customs and practices of the entertainment industry in California. Fur-
thermore, from a purely factual perspective, proving that screenplay ac-
quisition negotiations do not inherently implicate issues of future writ-
ing services would be a daunting endeavor. Finally, it is a well-
established principle that the Talent Agencies Act will be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its objects and suppress the mischief at which it is
directed.46
46. Buchwald, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
